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RECENT BOOKS 
THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1955. Pp. vi, 194. $3.50. 
Lawyers who heard Chief Justice Vanderbilt deliver the William W. 
Cook Foundation lectures in Ann Arbor in 1948, or who read the book 
Men and Measures in the Law published the following year, know in 
general the New Jersey jurist's views on judicial reform which are the 
subject of the University of Virginia lectures published in his latest volume. 
They cover the fields of selection of judges, procedural reform, elimina-
tion of delay, court organization and administration, and the simplifica-
tion and modernization of the substantive law. As to each he offers a 
happy combination of historical background, current developments, con-
structive criticism, and his own original suggestions. 
Typical of the latter is the interesting suggestion that we cannot hope 
to make much progress in improving the caliber of the judiciary until we 
have a simple and understandable declaration of the qualifications and 
attributes of a good appellate judge, a good trial judge, and a good local 
magistrate, so that those who are responsible for the selection of judges 
may have adequate standards by which to measure candidates for judicial 
office. Such a declaration, he suggests, would be no more difficult to 
formulate than the canons of judicial ethics; the only difference would 
be that the proposed declaration would deal with traits and experience 
necessary to equip a lawyer to go on the bench rather than with the rules 
governing his conduct once he is there. Although not designed as such 
a declaration, a passage of rare eloquence from the first page of the second 
chapter is of extreme interest in that connection: 
"We need judges learned in the law, not merely the law in books 
but, something far more difficult to acquire, the law as applied in 
action in the courtroom; judges deeply versed in the mysteries of human 
nature and adept in the discovery of the truth in the discordant testi-
mony of fallible human beings; judges beholden to no man, in-
dependent and honest and-equally important-believed by all men 
to be independent and honest; judges, above all, fired with con-
suming zeal to mete out justice according to law to every man, woman 
and child that may come before them and to preserve individual fn~e-
dom against any aggression of government; judges with the humility 
born of wisdom, patient and untiring in the search for truth and 
keenly conscious of the evils arising in a workaday world from any 
unnecessary delay." 
In his treatment of judicial selection Chief Justice Vanderbilt commends 
the Missouri plan (appointment by the governor from a list of names sub-
mitted by a nominating commission, appointees thereafter going before the 
voters in a non-competitive election for continuation in office), but he also 
emphasizes another principle of judicial selection about which not very 
much has been said-the bi-partisan judiciary. This, he says, has been en-
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joyed for many years in Delaware by constitutional provision and in New 
Jersey by tradition. It insures that at least half of the judges will not be ap-
pointed for political considerations, but because they are competent 
lawyers with judicial temperament. Furthermore, judges are not ex-
posed to the danger of not being reappointed simply because the governor 
at the moment is of the opposite political faith. He adds that decisions 
of a bi-partisan court have more weight in cases of political importance. 
These considerations suggest that in appointive states steps should be 
taken to achieve a bi-partisan judiciary, which, says Chief Justice Vander-
bilt, really is the only way in this country to achieve a non-partisan 
judiciary. 
In elective jurisdictions we think this is not quite so clear. The only 
way to have a bi-partisan judiciary in a state like New York or Illinois 
is for the party leaders to agree in advance on how many from each party 
are to be elected in each judicial election, and draw up the slate of nomi-
nations accordingly. But that is the substance of the "deals" that have 
been widely denounced in New York and Chicago on the ground that 
they effectually deprive the voters of all the power of choice and amount 
to outright appointment by party leaders. Nobody can deny, however, 
that the Missouri plan, good as its record is, would have been strengthened 
if the Missouri governors had established a tradition of bi-partisan 
appointments. 
Perhaps the greatest contrast between the Michigan and Virginia 
lectures is to be found in their respective chapters on court administra-
tion. In 1948 the New Jersey constitution had just been revised, but the 
new, system had not yet gone into operation at the time of the lectures. 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt described the efforts of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania to compel a trial judge to decide his cases, and he C spoke 
briefly and approvingly of the administrative offices in Connecticut and 
in the federal system. During the intervening years, he established in 
his own New Jersey judicial system an administrative office probably 
more effective and efficient than any other, and wrought miracles in 
cleaning up decades of delay and congestion through introduction of 
efficient procedures and business management. He rightly devotes a half-
dozen pages of the 1955 volume to describing this office and its work. It is 
the agency through which the power to assign judges from one point to 
another as needed is exercised, and it compiles the statistics on which the 
need for such assignments is predicated. It manages the fiscal and busi-
ness affairs of the courts, including a $3,000,000 budget. Its director 
supervises publications of opinions, serves as public relations officer for 
the courts, supplies information and investigates complaints. 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt then makes sharp criticism of certain fea-
tures of the federal administrative system, and of practically every feature 
of the administrative set-up established last year in New York. The 
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federal system, he says, lacks an executive head. It is like a corporation 
with a board of directors but no president. Not enough use is being 
made of the power of assignment of judges, even within circuits, and 
practically none at all from one circuit to another, largely because such 
assignments have been kept on a voluntary basis. He commends the statis-
tical work of the federal office, but points out one gaping hole in it-
a total lack of information as to how the individual judges spend their 
time and how much work they do. Finally, he criticizes the federal ad-
ministrative system for its reluctance to make mandatory such well-
recognized improvements as pre-trial procedure, even now in use in less 
than half of the federal courts. 
But it is the New York "court administration" plan recently enacted 
at the behest of the Temporary Commission on the Courts which the 
Chief Justice really finds lacking in merit. The quotation marks around 
the words "court administration" are his, for although those words are 
used over and over again in the statute, he denies that there is anything 
in it to justify them. In eleven scorching pages he shows how the judi-
cial conference is manned with persons who will always and inevitably 
be defenders of the status quo, and that although the language of admin-
istration is used, the group has no real administrative powers at all, but 
can only "study and make recommendations" with respect to the several 
areas where administrative action is so urgently needed. "The legislature 
has merely purloined a term that has a definite, known meaning in the 
nineteen states that have administrative establishments and misappropriated 
it for an office that is utterly without administrative powers." 
Again drawing on experience in New Jersey since 1948, Chief Justice 
Vanderbilt denounces the practice of scheduling oral argument before 
the judges have read the briefs, and he has nothing but scorn for the 
intra-court procedures that give rise to the one-man opinion-"a fraud on 
the litigants and the public." "No opinion," he says, "should become 
the opinion of the court without a full discussion by the entire court of 
all the issues developed at the argument before the case is assigned for 
the writing of the opinion; and after the opinion has been written it 
should likewise be studied by every member of the court and subjected 
to frank criticism in conference as to both substance and language." 
Reasonable and minimal standards, surely, and yet they are not met in 
many courts of last resort. 
In his last lecture the Chief Justice reviews, much as he did in 1948, 
the tremendous growth of judicial, legislative and administrative law and 
the efforts of the American Law Institute and others to find a way through 
the maze. He then develops a theme recently voiced by Pound, Hamo 
and others that the best hope is through law centers built around law 
schools, where judges, legislators, teachers and laymen may work together 
for the improvement of the law. Any law school, he says, which lifts 
its sights beyond the traditional role of training law students to face 
these problems is properly called a law center. 
890 MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
In his foreword to Men and Measures, Chief Justice Vanderbilt ac-
knowledged that there was a great deal of criticism in it, but justified 
it by saying frankly that the times were critical times. He added that 
young people prefer the "unembellished truth." It is an interesting 
sidelight on the judicial office that seven years have not softened the 
vigorous spirit of this man who all his life has fought his battles with 
all he had. On the contrary, the new volume is still more forthright 
and outspoken, as we have seen, and we cannot refrain from quoting 
one more somewhat dramatic example. In 1948 the new justice, who 
had just donned judicial robes after a long and active career at the bar, 
had this to say about the judges who oppose judicial reform: 
"Now and then we find an unusual judge or lawyer who is genu-
inely concerned with procedural reform, but generally we must ex-
pect active opposition from the bench and, at best, inertia from the 
bar." 
The following blistering words are from the 1955 volume: 
"I am convinced that the criminals, the gangsters, the corrupt 
local officials, the communistic subversives, and the apathetic citizens 
are no more dangerous to their communities and to the country at 
large than the judges, many of them amiable gentlemen, who oppose 
either openly or covertly every change in procedural law and admin-
istration _that would serve to eliminate technicalities, surprise and 
undue delay in the law simply because they would be called upon 
to learn new rules of procedure or new and more effective methods 
of work. Their number is legion." 
Glenn R. Winters, 
Secretary-Treasurer, 
American Judicature Society, 
